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1 Introduction and Overview1 
Guided by a long history of economic theory related to information transmission and 
aggregation properties of markets, Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988) were able to scientifically 
isolate and study the phenomena.  They found that while markets do have the capacity to 
perform many of the tasks suggested by theory, the market environment largely shapes that 
capacity.  In markets with a fundamental uncertainty about the state of nature, an interaction 
exists between the form of individual preferences and the instruments that exist in the markets. 
Specifically, if all individuals have the same preferences in the sense that the value of the 
security given the state of nature is the same for all, then markets have the capacity to aggregate 
information even when individuals have little previous trading experience.  When the 
preferences are different the aggregation properties of markets depend on the existence of 
multiple (Arrow-Debreu) securities or, as discovered by Forsythe and Lundholm (1990), the 
experience of the agents in the market.  Thus, from this line of research one can begin to 
understand the relationships among market environments, market instruments and the experience 
levels of individuals.  
 A second line of investigation was initiated later by Kagel and Levin (1986) guided by 
reports from field experiences in sealed bid auctions that lead to the discovery of a “winner’s 
                                                 
1 Effort sponsored by the Defense Advaanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and Air Force Research 
Laboratory, Air Force Material Command, USAF, under agreement number F30602-00-2-0623. The U.S. 
Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any 
copyright annotations thereon."  The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not 
be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the Air Force Research Laboratory, or the U.S. 
Government.  Additional support of the National Science Foundation is also acknowledged as is the support of the 
Laboratory for Experimental Economics and Political Science of the California Institute of Technology. 
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curse” in which information was not aggregated and the winners of the auction would engage in 
transactions that in retrospect they would prefer to have avoided.  The environment they studied 
differed from that of Plott and Sunder along several important dimensions. First, the structure of 
the information was different.  In both experimental settings individual agents were endowed 
with information that allowed them to eliminate states as possibilities. Plott and Sunder 
employed a discrete state space; the payoff to the security could take one of only a small number 
of values. By contrast, Kagel and Levin employed a near continuum state space to which an 
underlying measure could be applied easily to indicate if one state was “close” to another state, 
and the information received by individuals allowed them to reduce the possible states to a 
convex set.  In Kagel and Levin, like the Plott and Sunder experiments in which information 
aggregation was successful, given the state of nature the preferences of all bidders were identical. 
The difference was that the Kagel and Levin subjects were not endowed with the items and 
engaged in exchange; instead they bid on the items in a sealed bid, first-price auction.  Harstad, 
Kagel, and Levin (1987) theorize that the phenomenon they observed is due to a particular type 
of irrationality, a type of lack of common knowledge of rationality.  If all individuals bid higher 
as their signals are higher then the winner of the auction is the agent with the highest signal, 
which is almost certainly above the value of the item. Failure to adjust appropriately for this fact 
will result in a loss once the value of the item is realized. Lind and Plott (1991) found similar 
results in seller’s auctions where the winner’s curse was realized as opportunity costs rather than 
real losses. 
The research reported below represents a merger of the issues.  The underlying 
preference and information structure implemented by Kagel and Levin is joined with the asset 
and market structure implemented by Plott and Sunder.  The question posed is whether or not 
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information aggregation emerges as was observed by Plott and Sunder or whether the 
irrationality implicit in the winner’s curse emerges as was observed by Kagel and Levin.  The 
approach is empirical in the sense that no precise theory exists that can be tested, however, 
aspects of models can be applied and we ask to what extent some of the prominent predictions of 
models can be observed in the data.  The latter are explored as part of the general scientific effort 
to identify strengths and weaknesses of models in hope that theory can be developed to improve 
them. 
The basic results are that the models used to explain the winner’s curse are substantially 
rejected relative to models based on principles of rational expectations.   Information aggregation 
is observed and the winner’s curse is substantially removed.  Exactly how this happens is not 
clear but evidence suggests that the pattern of bids and asks is the vehicle that carries the 
information. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section Two contains the detailed design of the 
markets created for study together with parameters, the number of experimental sessions and 
their structure.  Section Three defines the measurements employed to identify market behavior in 
relation to information and information aggregation.  Section Four outlines competing economic 
models that are candidate explanations of what is observed.  While these models are themselves 
crude, they are based on substantially different principles and are employed to provide insights 
about the types of theory that might ultimately be successful.  Section Five outlines aspects of 
the statistical methodology that will be employed.  Section Six reports all results and Section 
Seven is a summary of Conclusions.  An appendix contains the instructions used in the 
experimental sessions. 
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2 Market Design 
2.1 Market Environments 
The markets were conducted as a series of periods. Except for the information 
distributed, each period was identical to the previous. The experiments centered on the use of a 
single market for a security paying a variable dividend, v.  Each period, each subject was 
allocated a single unit of the security and a cash loan with which to make transactions.  Prior to 
the opening of each period of an experimental session, the dividend was determined by the 
experimenter by a random draw from the range (150, 1500).   Each subject was given a private 
clue or signal about v a single, random draw si over the interval (v-200, v+200). Each subject 
knew his/her own signal and the fact that other subjects had independently drawn signals. Each 
subject was handed a new signal at the beginning of each period. The private clues were 
provided on small slips of paper that were collected at the end of the period. The information 
distributed to subjects was the same across sessions.2 
The trading institution was a double auction, where subjects were allowed to buy and/or 
sell units of the common value.  The market was open for a fixed, known amount of time (3-4 
minutes) during which subjects were allowed to place a bid to purchase a unit of the asset, place 
an offer to sell a unit of the asset, sell a unit of the asset they owned by accepting the current best 
bid, or buy a unit of the asset by accepting the current best offer.  Subjects were not constrained 
by cash on hand; each subject could potentially purchase all the units in the market. Short sales 
were not allowed but subject to that constraint subjects were allowed to speculate through 
purchase and resale.  At the end of the period the market was closed and the true dividend was 
                                                 
2 The only exception is the last period in the fourth and fifth sessions, where a different information 
structure was obtained from the one of another period by adding a constant while keeping the same variance. 
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announced.  Each subject was paid the value v for each asset held at the end of the period minus 
the cash spent and a fixed amount of 150 francs, to be thought of as a repayment of a loan from 
the experimenter for the initial endowment.  
2.2 Procedures and Experimental Design 
Five sessions were conducted in the Laboratory for Experimental Economics and 
Political Science at the California Institute of Technology. They involved the use of a 
computerized local area network and of software for multiple unit double auctions (MUDA). 
Each session had 10-14 Caltech undergraduates as subjects. All subjects had no previous 
experience with this particular setting, but some subjects were familiar with the double auction 
institution. All subjects were given the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the 
experimental procedures in a practice period. Each session consisted of 10-11 trading periods 
and lasted for about one and half hours.   The five sessions are summarized in Table 1. Detailed 
information on the particular dividend and signal draws is provided in Table 2. 
All subjects were endowed with exactly one unit of the security at the beginning of the 
period.  Thus the number of units in the market, the total supply of the security, was exactly 
equal to the number of subjects. While subjects could purchase many units at prices above the 
true dividend, the threat of bankruptcy was minimal. The cash stake provided by each bidder's 
endowment was usually sufficient to account for any reasonable amount of winner's curse. 
Nonetheless, subjects agreed that if they suffered losses they would work them off at $10 per 
hour.3 At the end of the session, the subjects’ experimental franc earnings were converted to U.S. 
 
 
3 No subjects suffered losses for the entire experiment, but there were occasions of periods in which 
bidders lost money (see Result 5).  
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dollars at the rate of $0.004 per franc. Subjects were paid their earnings plus a $7 show up fee in 
cash at the end of the session. 
  A copy of the instructions is provided in the appendix. 
3 Measurement 
A central aspect of the economics issues turn on information aggregation and the degree 
to which market activities anticipate, reflect or incorporate information that might be included in 
decisions.  Three different measurements can be applied to assess the degrees to which 
information might be incorporated. 
3.1 Aggregate Information Available (AIA)   
If all information available in the economy is collected and pooled, the result would be 
AIA.  In the case of these markets it would produce the best estimate of the dividend and would 
be the mean of the signals that were distributed. If there were N subjects, then the average signal 
is given by is s N= å . 
3.2 Not Rejected Intersection (NRI)   
The NRI represents a somewhat weaker concept of information aggregation.  The NRI is 
the set of states that can not be rejected by the information held by some individual. For a given 
signal is , an individual knows that the true value must be within 200 francs 
[ ]200, 200i iv s sÎ - + . The intersection of these ranges for the maximum and minimum signals 
defines the set of NRI states [ ]max min200, 200NRI s s= - + . Clearly, the true dividend must be in 
this set but it is possible that s is not in this set. 
-9- 
3.3 Clairvoyance (C)   
Clairvoyance means that the market acts as if it knows the actual state v. Of course that is 
a degree of aggregation that would not be expected since the actual state is known to none of the 
participants at the time of decision and becomes known only ex-post to all decisions.  
Nevertheless it is a measure with some inherent interest since it helps us assess both the nature of 
the information that is distributed and the gains and losses experienced by subjects.  
In previous studies on information aggregation (Plott and Sunder 1982, 1988) in markets, 
these three measures coincided since, by pooling their information, agents could perfectly 
discern the true state. 
3.4 Winner’s Curse 
A brief digression of terminology is in order.  Traditional use of the concept of “winner’s 
curse” involves some ambiguity in light of the topic of this paper. Obviously, the term means 
that the buyer paid “too much” in light of some measure of information and models of the 
phenomena suggest that agents fail to condition this measure on the fact that the winner must 
have information at the extreme of this measure.  Thus there are two issues, what is the measure 
of information and what parts of it are missing from the decision rule used by the winner.  Since 
there are three measures of information we can define three concepts of a “winner’s curse”: 
· WCAIA means that prices are too high relative to s  (AIA). 
· WCNRI means that prices are too high relative to all values in the NRI set. 
· WCC means that prices are too high relative to the ex-post knowledge of the state (C).  
While the term winner’s curse is often used to mean actual realized loss it should be 
recognized that such terminology suggests decision rules that incorporate clairvoyance.  We 
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make these distinctions in order to avoid potential confusion that can emerge when the word 
“curse” is used in the context of an information aggregation issue. 
4 Models 
We examined two models as potential explanations of the aggregate behavior of the 
market. The fully revealing rational expectations equilibrium (RE) and private information (PI) 
models were originally studied by Plott and Sunder (1982, 1988). They represent extreme 
contrasts in information transmission between the participants.  
The models presented here are static, equilibrium predictions of behavior of the market. 
Clearly, the phenomena observed in the lab involve complex dynamics and variable individual 
behavior. The hope is that by understanding which static model performs best we will be able to 
guide the development of a dynamic model of information transmission in markets.4 A summary 
of the price predictions of each model is presented in Table 3. The table lists the predicted prices 
assuming that there are 13 traders. Since the RE and PI models depend upon the distribution of 
signals, the price predictions for sessions 1 and 4 varied slightly but not significantly. In all 
cases, the data analysis in the Results section used the appropriate predictions. 
4.1 Rational Expectations 
The rational expectations equilibrium (Lucas 1972) is the natural extension of the notion 
of a competitive equilibrium to situations where individuals might have asymmetric and 
incomplete information.  Under the fully revealing rational expectations hypothesis, all agents 
                                                 
4 While there have been attempts to model the dynamics of double auctions in settings with complete 
information (Easley and Ledyard, 1992), there are no dynamic models of price formation in double auctions with 
asymmetric information. Jordan (1982) presented a dynamic model of rational expectations formation but his model 
is not easily comparable to our data. 
-11- 
are assumed to act in equilibrium as if they know the signals of all the other agents. Given this 
information, traders act as if they are in a competitive market. 
If each agent observes the signals of the other agents, their best estimate of the actual 
dividend is then the mean signal.  Therefore, under the assumption that participants are risk 
neutral, demand is perfectly elastic at the average of the signals observed by the traders.5  
The price prediction of this model is therefore equal to the average of the signals 
( REp s= ), which is equivalent to the AIA information aggregation measure. At any lower price, 
all agents would want to sell their entire endowment. At a higher price, all agents would be 
willing to buy indefinitely. The allocation prediction of the RE model is for no trade to occur. 
Notice that, given the imperfect information provided by the signals, this model does not 
necessarily imply that the holders of units will experience no loss when the state is realized ex-
post.  If s  is greater than the true dividend, then all agents will suffer from some winner's curse 
relative to clairvoyance. 
However, as the number of bidders (and signals) gets large, bidders should perfectly price 
the common value asset according to the RE model since the information gets better as the 
number of signals increase. 
 
4.2 Private Information 
The private information model assumes that traders use only their own private 
information in forming expectations about the true dividend. As opposed to the RE model, where 
                                                 
5 If the dividend was revealed with certainty, the assumption of risk neutrality would be unnecessary. In 
this design, there is some residual uncertainty that might lead a risk adverse trader to limit his/her actions. 
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agents are assumed to learn all the information available in the market, the PI model describes 
agents who do not update their information. 
Under the PI model, each trader's best estimate of the true dividend is given by is . If 
traders are risk neutral, they will have perfectly elastic demand at their observed signal. Under 
the assumption that agents act competitively, the PI model predicts that the agent with the 
highest signal will purchase all the available units of the asset at a price greater than or equal to 
the second highest signal.6 
The PI model also predicts an extreme form of the winner's curse. As long as the second 
highest signal is greater than the actual dividend, the bidder with the highest signal will pay more 
than the true dividend for all units of the asset (WCC).7 Except for rare signal draws, the PI 
model also predicts a winner’s curse relative to the other measures of aggregation (WCAIA and 
WCNRI) 
5 Statistical Methodology 
The theoretical models discussed in Section 4 are static equilibrium models. The data 
generated in the experimental sessions are the result of a dynamic process. Therefore, tests that 
compare the average trading prices to the static predictions are likely to fail, as they do not take 
into account the dynamics of the information aggregation process; many early trades may be far 
from the actual dividend, or the market may converge to the actual dividend from one direction. 
Even in markets of this sort without private information, one can often reject the equality of the 
trading price and the competitive equilibrium price despite the obvious movement towards it.  
                                                 
6 We assume that price prediction was actually equal to the second highest signal. Since trading prices were 
rarely above the second highest price, using the minimum acceptable PI price gives the PI model its best chance. 
7 In all draws of dividends and signals, the second highest signal was greater than the actual dividend. 
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A more appropriate test, as suggested in Noussair, Plott and Riezman (1997), is to 
examine the convergence of data to the one of static models.  Given a dependent variable (such 
as the difference of the trading price from the actual dividend) and a particular valuation draw, 
the model assumes that each session may start from a different origin but all sessions will adjust 
following a common functional form. The statistical model is given by: 
 11 1 1 2
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where i  is the index of the session and 1, ,i in N= K  is the index of the trading period. iD  is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 only for data in occurring in session i , and K  is the 
number of sessions. The dependent variable 
i i in n n
z p m= -  measures the difference of the 
average trading price of the period in  from one of the information measures, inm , discussed in 
Section 3. The error term 
in
u is assumed to be normally distributed with mean zero. 
The model is intended to capture the assumption that the experiment data is converging to 
a common asymptote. For early periods, in is small so the asymptote term 
1i
i
n
n
æ ö- ÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
 is also small. 
For large in the starting point term 
1
i
i
D
n
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÷ç ÷ç ÷ç ÷çè ø
 for the particular session gets small, and most of the 
weight is shifted to the common 2B term. 
The model can be used to examine whether the data appear to be converging to the 
particular price predictions of the models or if information aggregation takes place. If the data is 
converging, we would expect to find the value of 2B  not significantly different from 0.  But , 
even if this is not the case, we might be able to say that there is weak convergence to the if 
1 2iB B>  for any given session i  since this would indicate that the trading prices are getting 
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closer to the information measure itm . We can also compare the asymptote terms for different 
dependent variables in order to obtain another measure of relative performance. 
 
6 Results 
Figures 1-5 contain time series of the trading price data for each of the experimental 
sessions. On the vertical axes the trading price in experimental currency (francs) is measured, 
and the time in seconds at which the trades occurred is measured on the horizontal axes. The 
horizontal lines indicate the price predictions of the various models RE (equal to AIA), PI (equal 
to the second highest signal) and the actual dividend (equal to C). 
The first result is to be expected and is included only to avoid any ambiguity about what 
is seen in the data.  All models can be rejected in a statistical sense, and that is the content of 
Result 1.  Subsequent results are focused on the relative accuracy of models as opposed to some 
unspecified alternative.  
      
Result 1: The average trading price is most often significantly different from the price 
predictions of all models. No model can be claimed as accurate in an absolute sense. 
     Support. We can reject the null hypothesis that the average trading price is equal to the actual 
dividend (C), the average signal (RE and AIA), and the second highest signal (PI) for almost all 
trading periods and sessions. In 40 out of 53 trading periods the mean trading price is 
significantly different than the actual dividend ( .10a =  significance level), in 39 out of 53 
trading periods the mean trading price is significantly different than the mean signal, and in 49 
out of the 53 trading periods the mean trading price is significantly different than the PI price 
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prediction. Even using the most liberal information measurement, NRI, the average trading price 
was significantly different more than half the time (27 out of 53 observations).8  
     While the first result was negative, the next results initiate an examination of the relative 
accuracy of models and suggest that information aggregation is taking place.  It summarizes the 
fact that the data are most accurately represented by the RE model.  Part of such features of the 
data is captured by the second result. 
 
Result 2: The trading prices are closest to RE price predictions. 
     Support. When we examine the average absolute difference of the prices in relation to the 
predictions of models, the prices are closest to the RE prediction.  Two different methodologies 
are used to support the result.  First, the absolute average deviation pooled across trading periods 
from the actual dividend, RE, and PI models are listed in Table 4. In four out of the five sessions, 
the differences are smallest under the RE price prediction. In all cases, the PI price prediction is 
the worst performer. Using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test, we can reject the null hypothesis that 
the absolute differences are the same under the PI prediction as the absolute deviations from the 
RE and actual dividend predictions (p-value = 0.0313) in favor the alternative hypothesis that the 
deviations are greater under than PI model than those under the RE and actual dividend. The 
same test fails to find a statistically significant difference in the errors associated with the RE and 
actual dividend price predictions.  
 The second method of supporting the result controls for the possibility that some early 
periods might be close to the average signal whereas late periods might be much closer to 
another model. For this reason, we now turn to the convergence tests discussed in Section 5. The 
                                                 
8 We determined an average trading price to be different than the NRI set if the average price was either 
significantly greater than the maximum of the set or significantly less than the minimum of the set. 
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convergence regressions are presented in Table 5. The dependent variables are the difference in 
the average trading price from the mean signal (RE), the second highest signal (PI), and the 
dividend (Actual).  The asymptote term 2B provides further support for the prevalence of the RE 
model over the PI prediction. While the RE and Actual regression asymptote are close to zero,9 
the PI asymptote is far from (and below) the zero convergence result. Interestingly, the starting 
point terms for the five sessions are also close to zero in the RE and Actual regressions meaning 
that the early period trading prices were also near these predictions. 
     Both models make strong predictions about trading patterns.  The rational expectations model 
predicts that no trades at all will occur. This is because of the common value of the security. If 
that common value is known to all, as predicted by the rational expectations model, then there 
are no gains from trade.  By contrast the private information model predicts that all units will be 
absorbed by the individual with the highest private value. Since each individual was endowed 
with a single unit, if there are n subjects the number of trades required by the model will be n-1. 
Clearly these predictions are extreme and in some sense not expected. A problem also exists due 
to speculation and the possibility of re-trading. Thus, trades themselves cannot be used to assess 
the private information model.  Nevertheless, intuition leads one to expect that if information is 
becoming aggregated the propensity to trade is reduced. The next two results ask about the 
tendencies in the markets. To which extreme are the data moving?  The answer is that the 
movement is toward the prediction of the rational expectations model. 
 
Result 3: The no trade prediction of the RE model can be rejected, but trading decreases in later 
periods.  
                                                 
9 For both the RE and Actual regression, depending on one’s choice of significance the asymptote term 
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     Support. There is persistent and sustained trading in all sessions. The average number of 
trades divided by the first and last five trading periods is listed in Table 6. The experiment with 
the least trading, session 4, averages more than six completed trades per period.  There does, 
however, appear to be movement towards the no trade prediction of the RE model. In all 
sessions, fewer trades are completed in the final five periods than in the initial five periods.10  
 
Result 4: The final allocations are more consistent with RE than PI. 
Support. The data are viewed in two ways.  First, the percentage of misallocated units 
under each model is listed in Table 7. In all cases, there are less misallocated units under the RE 
model.11 In fact, in only 3 out of the 53 observations was the number of misallocated units 
smaller under the PI prediction. There also appears to be some movement towards the RE 
allocation prediction. In 4 out of the 5 experimental sessions, the misallocated units under the RE 
model decline in the last five periods, whereas the number of misallocated units increase under 
the PI prediction.  
 The second way to see the allocation of units is to examine the distribution of ownership. 
The PI model predicts a degenerate distribution on the highest signal trader; the no trade 
prediction of the RE model would yield a uniform distribution over all signal ranks. The average 
ownership distributions for periods 2, 10, and the average of all periods is displayed in Figure 6. 
The RE (no trade) prediction is included for reference. It is the case that higher signal bidders do 
tend to be majority owners at the end of the period. On average, the top four signal holders own 
slightly less than half of the assets. Also, the early period distributions tend to be skewed further 
 
coefficient can be rejected from equality with zero, but it is still quite close.  
10 A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test rejects equality of the number early period trades and the number of late 
period trades with a p-value of 0.0313. 
11 A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test rejects equality of these variables with a p-value of 0.0313. 
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toward the higher signals than later period distributions. In period 2, the top three signal traders 
hold 54% of the assets, but, in period 10, the 50% ownership mark is not crossed until the 
seventh highest signal. 
 The different types of winner’s curse measurements reflect different inquiries about the 
nature of the phenomenon.   Historically, and for those who have an interest in the effect of 
losses on behavior, the relevant measure is the ex-post experience, WCC.  For those interested in 
information aggregation the appropriate measure is WCAIA.  As it turns out it makes little 
difference which measure is used because the winner’s curse is small.  The fact is summarized 
by the next result. 
 
Result 5: A winner’s curse exists but it is small relative to magnitudes expected under the private 
information model. It decreases with experience. 
 Support.    Prices are more often above the actual dividend. In 25 of the 40 periods where 
the average trading price is significantly different than the actual dividend, the trading price is 
significantly greater than the dividend. Despite the fact that prices were usually higher, bidders 
rarely incurred real losses. Only 20 out of the 661 (3.0%) individual profits observations12 were 
for real losses. The average of those losses was only 179 francs, which converts to $.72. In 
contrast, the PI model predicted losses 42 times with an average loss of 874 francs ($3.50).  
Further, the winner’s curse appears to decline in later periods; there was only one observation of 
real losses in the final three trading periods.  
 The winner’s curse is even less pronounced when the trading prices are compared with 
WCAIA and WCNRI. When compared to the AIA measure, 25 trading periods exhibit an average 
                                                 
12 An observation here is profit outcome for a particular experiment, trader, and period combination. 
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trading price greater than the mean signal. The average difference is only 47 francs ($.19) for 
these periods. Only 16 out of 53 (30.2%) of trading periods exhibited prices that were 
significantly greater than the NRI range. When the average price was greater than NRI, the 
average difference fell to 35 francs or $.14 
Given the strong evidence that these markets aggregate information efficiently and that a 
severe winner’s curse does not exist, an obvious next step of inquiry is into the sources of 
aggregation and the nature of the aggregation process. While the models discussed previously are 
static descriptions of equilibrium outcomes, the process of information aggregation must be a 
dynamic one. One source of the dynamic explanation may come in an examination of the bids 
and asks.  Table 8 contains data on the average number of bids and/or asks placed between 
trades. If traders learn to examine the bid and ask amount for information on the true dividend, 
we might expect that the number of offers placed might increase over time.  
 
Result 6: Information aggregation appears to take place through the bids and asks. 
Support.     The average numbers of bids/asks between completed transactions increases in 
the later periods.  In 4 out of 5 sessions, the average number of offers between trades increases in 
the last five periods; in the fifth session the difference is small. A Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test 
allows us the reject equality of the number of offers between trades with a p-value of 0.062.  
 Do more bids and asks actually help the aggregation process? We examined the 
following simple model in order to attempt to understand if increased patience, in the form 
waiting to see more offers, actually lead to prices that were closer to were closer the aggregation 
measures. The unit of observation, indexed by i, is a particular trade in a period and session. 
Consider the following linear model: 
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 1 2i i iz B B c u= + +  (6.1) 
where i iz p v= - is the absolute difference of the trading price from the dividend, and ic  is the 
number of bids and asks since the previous trade in that period. If more bids/asks lead to better 
aggregation we would expect the sign of 2B to be negative. The results of this simple ordinary 
least squares regression yield a highly significant value of -3.66 (p-value 0.000) for the 
coefficient.13 Therefore, bids and asks to appear to play an important role. Exactly how they are 
incorporated into the bidders’ decisions remains a topic for future research.  
7 Conclusion 
This study continues a long history of empirical approaches to understanding the 
interactions among market structures and information aggregation in markets.   For the most part, 
the focus is on market environments in which the behavior of individuals is not well understood 
and so no well developed theory exists to be tested. Instead the study is guided by a series of 
empirical facts and models that have been useful in the past in capturing what is observed. The 
ability to build the models from first principles is evolving and hopefully the results from this 
study will facilitate that effort. 
The most basic result is that in the environment studied here the tendency is for the 
winner’s curse to be small and decreasing with experience.  However, it does not go away and if 
the preferences were to be adjusted for possible risk aversion it would certainly be present.  
Basically, the prices tend to be slightly above what the risk neutral prices would be if all 
information was aggregated.  Thus, some information remains to be aggregated. 
                                                 
13 A similar regression the effect on absolute distance from the mean signals yielded nearly identical 
results. 
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That information aggregation is taking place is well supported.  Models based on the 
principles used to explain the winner’s curse in sealed bid markets are resoundingly rejected.  By 
contrast, aspects of the rational expectations model receive support. For example, the hypothesis 
that markets will be driven to the equilibrium based on private values (PI) is completely rejected.  
Thus in these markets, individuals do not tend to exhibit the full irrationality that is useful in 
explaining patterns of behavior observed in sealed bid institutions. At the same time, patterns of 
ownership, income and patterns of trading exhibit features in the direction of equilibrium 
predictions of fully revealing rational expectations (RE) models. Information and a common 
understanding of rationality is emerging. 
Exactly how the information finds its way into markets remains a mystery. However, 
evidence is growing that the source of understanding is contained in the bids and asks.  As early 
bids and asks increase the markets get closer to having fully aggregated the information.  As 
market participants gain more experience they tend to wait longer in terms of the number of bids 
and asks before trades take place. Thus, the patterns found here are similar to those observed by 
Plott and Sunder (1988) and their conjecture that the information is contained in the bids and 
asks as opposed to the prices received further support.  The fact that the bids and asks can be the 
carriers of the information has implications for our understanding of information aggregation in 
relation to market micro structures. Sealed bid processes have no bids and asks to observe.  The 
carriers of the information are absent, and as a result the institution has no capacity to transmit 
private information and it might also have only limited capacity to convey information that 
would lead to a common understanding of rationality.  As a result, institutions with a sealed bid 
feature might universally exhibit substantially different properties than the continuous double 
auction.   
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Appendix 
Experiment Instructions 
 
 This is an experiment in the economics of market decision making. The instructions are simple 
and if you follow them carefully and make good decisions you might earn money which will be paid to you in cash. 
 
In this experiment, you will be allowed to buy and sell a commodity in a sequence of trading periods. In 
each trading period, all participants will begin with 1 unit. During the trading period, you are free to purchase and/or 
sell units as you see fit. The precise value of the asset at the time you make your decisions will be unknown to you. 
Instead, each of you will receive some information regarding the value of the commodity which you may find useful 
in making your decisions. The process of determining the value of the units will be described below. 
 
The currency in these markets is francs. Each franc will be worth .004 dollars to you. 
 
At the end of the period, a single redemption value will be announced for all units that you hold. For 
example, if you hold 3 units at the end of the trading period and the redemption value is announced to be 450, you 
will receive 1350 francs, or 
 
Total Redemption Value = (# units) x (redemption value) 
 
In order to determine your profits at the end of a trading period you will need to consider two other factors. 
First, you must add your cash inventory at the end of the period (given at the top of your screen). At the beginning of 
the period, your cash inventory is 0. However, through the process of buying and selling units you may accumulate 
cash (your sale values exceeded you purchase values) or you may have a deficit (your purchase values exceeded 
your sale values). In either case, this number should be added to your Total Redemption Value. Second, you must 
pay the experimenter 150 francs at the end of each trading period. You may think of this as repayment of a loan for 
the initial unit that you began the period with. Thus your final profit calculation is given by: 
 
Profit = Total Redemption Value + Cash Inventory - 150 
 
Remember! If your cash inventory is negative, you must subtract that number from your Total Redemption 
Value. You may record your period profits on the accounting sheet provided. 
 
Determination of Redemption Value 
 
The value of the assets (V) will be assigned randomly and will lie between 150 and 1500 inclusively. For 
each auction, any value within this interval has an equally likely chance of being drawn. The value of the assets can 
never be less than 150 nor more than 1500. The values V are determined randomly and independently from period to 
period. A high value of V in one period tells you nothing about the likely value in the next period. It does not even 
preclude the same value of V appearing in later periods. It is as if each number between 150 and 1500 is stamped on 
a single ball and placed in an urn. A draw from the urn determines the redemption value for a period. The ball is 
replaced and another draw next period determines the redemption value for that period. 
 
Private Information Signals  
 
Although you do not know the precise value of the item in any particular trading period, you will receive 
information which will narrow down the range of possible values. This will consist of a private information signal 
which is selected randomly from an interval whose lower bound is V minus epsilon, and whose upper bound is V 
plus epsilon. Any value within this interval has an equally likely chance of being drawn and being assigned to one of 
you as your private information signal. You will always know what the value of epsilon is. 
 
Throughout this experiment, the value of epsilon is 200. 
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For example, suppose that the value of the asset is  762 and that epsilon is 200. Then each of you will 
receive a private information signal which will consist of a randomly drawn number that will be between 562 (V-
epsilon = 762-200) and 962 (V+epsilon = 762+200). Any number in this interval has an equally likely chance to be 
drawn as you signal value. As before, it is as if each number between V-epsilon and V+epsilon is stamped on a 
single ball and placed in an urn. A draw from the urn determines the private information signal for an individual. 
The ball is  replaced and a second draw determines the signal for another player 
 
The line diagram provides a description of the relationship of redemption values and signals. 
 
 
1500150 
V 
Your 
Signal 
V- 
epsilon 
 
V+ 
epsilon 
+
V 
Possible values for V 
given your signal 
 
  
You will note that the value of V of the asset must always be between your signal value minus epsilon, and 
your signal value plus epsilon. 
 
Finally, you may receive a signal value below 150 or above 1500. This merely indicates that the value of 
the auctioned item is close to 150 or 1500. 
 
Your signal values are strictly private information. DO NOT REVEAL THEM TO ANYONE ELSE. 
 
You will not be told the value of V until after the close of the trading period. 
 
Are there any questions? 
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Figures and Tables 
 
Session
Number 
of 
Subjects
Endow-
ment 
/subject
Number 
of 
Periods
Period 
Length
Conversion 
$/franc
Dividend 
Draws
1 14 1 10 4 min 0.004 1-10
2 13 1 11 4 min 0.004 1-11
3 13 1 11 4 min 0.004 1-11
4 10 1 11 3 min 0.004 1-10,12
5 13 1 10 3 min 0.004 1-8,11,12  
Table 1: Experimental Session Parameters. The Dividend Draws column refers to the particular dividend/signal 
realizations used. Table 2 contains information on the dividend draws. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Actual 
Dividend 776 1447 320 420 581 1000 321 1029 989 1234 870 752
0 752 1578 125 521 604 1070 127 1107 1040 1225 713 741
1 763 1285 197 488 677 1006 231 941 1053 1217 1062 731
2 899 1280 513 473 507 1091 378 1131 1073 1242 705 709
3 722 1553 218 243 435 1088 339 897 1004 1213 932 700
4 661 1499 448 459 592 1178 488 831 901 1094 891 656
5 976 1333 175 311 505 984 228 1027 1115 1148 969 724
6 637 1332 279 348 616 1176 509 861 938 1367 1059 759
7 828 1279 360 500 588 929 220 894 1063 1312 1065 787
8 823 1403 191 267 553 984 459 1190 913 1265 1059 676
9 576 1628 451 525 485 1007 399 1142 793 1306 707 763
10 576 1626 183 430 529 1065 303 1128 831 1166 870 606
11 885 1403 515 442 538 961 448 1004 997 1057 889 678
12 867 1355 223 455 560 1042 130 832 1099 1429 834 848
Mean 
Signal 767 1427 298 420 553 1045 328 999 986 1234 904 721
Variance 16271 17645 19615 9183 4043 5897 17407 16951 10574 10981 18774 3842
Low 776 1428 313 364 477 995 309 990 915 1229 865 1229
High 776 1479 325 443 612 1129 327 1031 993 1257 905 1257
Dividend Draws
Signals
Su
bj
ec
t
NRI Range
 
Table 2: Dividend Draw Information 
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Draw RE PI
1 767 899
2 1427 1626
3 298 513
4 420 521
5 553 616
6 1045 1176
7 328 488
8 999 1142
9 986 1099
10 1234 1367
11 904 1062
12 721 787
Model
 
Table 3: Model Price Predictions. 
Session Actual RE PI
1 48.66 53.52 115.82
2 71.81 66.83 142.01
3 67.19 65.02 151.29
4 63.99 60.21 109.09
5 104.72 101.86 166.91
Model
 
Table 4: Average Absolute Price Deviation from Model Predictions 
Model B11 B12 B13 B14 B15 B2
47.02 -37.17 -15.27 -12.9 15.51 18.92
(0.174) (0.280) (0.656) (0.706) (0.651) (0.028)
-123.33 -206.69 -184.79 -145.46 -151.06 -103.92
(0.024) (0.000) (0.001) (0.008) (0.006) (0.000)
25.82 -53.95 -32.06 -36.99 -2.5 19.89
(0.536) (0.199) (0.443) (0.376) (0.952) (0.057)
RE
PI
C
Estimated Coefficient
 
Table 5: Convergence Regression Results. Terms in parenthesis are the p-values associated with each coefficient. 
The dependent variables are the difference in the average trading price from the mean signal (RE), the 
second highest signal (PI), and the dividend (Actual). 
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Session
First 5 
Periods
Last 5 
Periods
All 
Periods
1 15.0 10.8 12.9
2 10.8 7.8 9.3
3 10.4 8.6 9.5
4 7.0 6.8 6.7
5 19.6 10.2 14.9
Average Trades Completed
 
Table 6: Average Trades Completed 
Session
First 5 
Periods
Last 5 
Periods
All 
Periods
First 5 
Periods
Last 5 
Periods
All 
Periods
1 39 41 40 80 83 81
2 40 36 38 82 75 78
3 51 48 48 82 83 83
4 36 30 34 72 90 80
5 45 43 44 74 82 78
RE PI
Model
 
Table 7: Percentage of Mis allocated Units 
Session
First 5 
Periods
Last 5 
Periods
All 
Periods
1 6.60 8.03 7.32
2 6.97 9.34 8.05
3 6.78 9.05 7.91
4 9.21 8.32 9.29
5 3.41 4.58 4.00
Average Bids/Asks Between 
Trades
 
Table 8: Average Numbers of Bids/Asks Between Transactions 
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Figure 1: Session 1 Trading Prices 
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Figure 2: Session 2 Trading Prices 
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Figure 3: Session 3 Trading Prices 
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Figure 4: Session 4 Trading Prices 
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Figure 5: Session 5 Trading Prices 
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Figure 6: Cumulative Distribution of Final Ownership Position  
